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Abstract
It is commonly argued that skilled immigration bene¯ts the destination country
through several channels. Yet, only a small group of countries reports to have policies
in place aimed at increasing the intake of skilled immigrants. Why? In this paper
we analyze the factors that a®ect a direct measure of individual attitudes towards
skilled migration, focusing on two main channels: the labor market and the welfare
state. We ¯nd that more educated natives are less likely to favor skilled immigration {
consistent with the labor-market channel { while richer people are more likely to do so
{ in accordance with the welfare state channel under the tax adjustment model. Our
¯ndings thus suggest that the labor market competition threat perceived by skilled
natives in the host countries might be driving the observed cautious policies.
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11 Introduction
Skilled migrants are likely to bene¯t destination countries by increasing employment, capital
accumulation and income (Ortega and Peri 2009). Moreover, the contribution of immigrants
to the ¯scal balance of the welfare state improves with their skill level (Boeri, Hanson, and
McCormick 2002; Bonin, Ra®elhueschen, and Walliser 2000). However, only a small number
of countries have made \skill" the main criterion to select immigrants (Bertoli et al. 2009).1
What is the role played by public opinion in explaining this somewhat surprising ¯nding?
More generally, why do people favor or oppose skilled immigration?
The existing literature has emphasized two main channels through which individual at-
titudes towards (overall) immigration are a®ected. On the one hand, several studies have
highlighted the role played by non{economic drivers, and in particular cultural and ethnic
factors (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Burns and
Gimpel 2000). On the other, a growing number of papers has shown that economic factors
systematically a®ect preferences. Following Borjas (1999), labor market and welfare state
considerations have been the focus of researchers' attention.
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) ¯nd that, in the United States, unskilled workers are more
likely to oppose immigration, relative to skilled workers. This result is consistent with the
labor market competition hypothesis, since immigrants in the U.S. are on average less skilled
than natives, and thus compete with unskilled workers in the labor market. The robustness of
the labor-market result is con¯rmed by Mayda (2006) in a cross{country setting: individual
skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes in countries where immigrants
are on average unskilled, while it is negatively correlated with attitudes in countries where
immigrants are on average skilled, relative to the native population.2 Furthermore, both
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2006) show that skill does not play a role in
shaping attitudes when the sample is restricted to individuals outside the labor force. Thus
the e®ect of skill is indeed working through the labor market channel.
Turning to the role played by the welfare state, using U.S. data, Hanson, Scheve, and
Slaughter (2007) and Hanson (2005) ¯nd that the negative correlation between skill and anti-
immigration preferences { driven by the labor market { becomes smaller in absolute value
and sometimes positive in states with high exposure to immigrant ¯scal pressure. Using
cross-country data, Facchini and Mayda (2009) ¯nd that, in countries where immigrants are
1Furthermore, Bertoli et al. 2009 show that only 25 percent of the large set of countries in their study
has policies aimed at increasing the intake of skilled migrants.
2O'Rourke and Sinnott (2004) ¯nd similar results.
2unskilled relative to natives, individual income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration
preferences, while the correlation changes sign in destinations characterized by skilled mi-
gration. Both sets of results { for the U.S. and across countries { are consistent with the
welfare-state channel, in particular under the tax adjustment model of immigration attitudes.
While non{economic factors undoubtedly play an important role, these ¯ndings can hardly
be reconciled with the view that economic characteristics are just proxies for non-economic
drivers, as has been suggested by some authors (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). In other
words, economic considerations do appear to play a systematic role in shaping attitudes.
An important caveat that applies to all the studies mentioned above is that they use data
on attitudes towards overall migration and, at the same time, assume that respondents in
each country are aware of the actual skill composition of migrants coming to their country. In
other words, the existing literature carries out an indirect study of attitudes towards skilled
and unskilled migrants. In this paper, on the other hand, we focus on a direct measure of
individual attitudes towards skilled migration, taking advantage of a question on this topic
which has been included in the 2002-2003 round of the European Social Survey (ESS).3
Following the literature, we focus on the role played by the labor market and the welfare
state channels. We ¯nd that more educated natives are less likely to favor skilled immigration
{ consistent with the labor-market channel { while richer people are more likely to do so
{ in accordance with the welfare state channel under the tax adjustment model of Facchini
and Mayda (2009). Our results also show that skilled immigrants are perceived to be more
desirable than non-skilled ones on non{economic grounds, especially by individuals who are
concerned about security and by those who value traditions and customs.
Our analysis thus lends new support to the role of economic drivers of individual attitudes
towards immigration, based on direct evidence on preferences towards skilled migration. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ¯rst to do so using a large cross{country dataset.
In virtue of their simplicity, the ¯ndings of this paper are likely to represent the cleanest
results on the topic in the literature. In addition and importantly, to the extent that the
political process re°ects the uneven e®ect that skilled immigration has on di®erent groups in
the population { and the ability of those who lose to capture the attention of governments {
our results provide an explanation for the lack of substantive progress in the implementation
of skilled-selective migration policies.
The only other paper which has taken advantage of direct evidence on preferences to-
wards skilled and unskilled immigration is the recent contribution by Hainmueller and Hiscox
3The 2002-2003 ESS covers more than 40,000 individuals.
3(2008). In their work, the authors use an online survey carried out in the United States be-
tween 2007 and 2008 on a sample of slightly less than 1600 individuals.4 Respondents are
randomly divided in two groups. The ¯rst group is asked whether the US should admit
a higher number of skilled immigrants, while the second is asked whether the US should
instead admit a higher number of unskilled immigrants. The authors merge together an-
swers to the two di®erent questions and investigate the role played by labor market and
welfare state drivers of attitudes, using cross{state di®erences in ¯scal exposure to immigra-
tion.5 Di®erently from our study, the authors ¯nd only weak support for the role played
by economic determinants of individual preferences. Importantly, the analysis carried out
by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2008) su®ers from two shortcomings. On the one hand, the
use of answers to two di®erent questions as a unique dependent variable is likely to create
substantial noise in the estimates.6 Secondly, the impact of the labor market and welfare
state channels is investigated separately, i.e. in two di®erent empirical speci¯cations. This is
likely to generate biased estimates of the two e®ects since { as has been shown by Facchini
and Mayda (2009) { education and income are highly correlated at the individual level.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main economic
models that have been used to analyze the determinants of individual attitudes towards
immigration. Section 3 describes our data, while section 4 presents our main results. Section
5 concludes the paper.
2 Understanding individual attitudes towards skilled
migrants
Individual attitudes towards skilled migrants are a®ected by a number of economic and
non-economic factors. To understand the economic drivers of preferences, we follow the
existing literature, and assume that respondents are characterized by self-interest maximizing
behavior. This implies that, in forming their opinion, individuals consider the impact of
skilled migration on their utility. Since the economic impact of skilled migration is uneven
across the population, the main economic drivers of attitudes are associated with income-
distribution e®ects. In addition, from a non-economic point of view, voters' perception of
4The experiment carried out by the authors was embedded in the Cognitive Style Survey, but unfor-
tunately no further information is provided concerning the representativeness of the sample at the desired
(state) level of aggregation.
5See Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007).
6In addition, the purpose of the randomization in this setting is not completely clear.
4skilled migration is related to political, cultural and security issues.
The income-distribution e®ects of skilled migration can take place through two main
channels, i.e. the labor market and the welfare state channels. Assume that skilled and
unskilled labor are combined to produce a single good according to a constant returns to
scale production function (factor-proportions-analysis model). Theory predicts that, through
the labor market channel, the income-distribution e®ects of migration depend on the skill
composition of migrants relative to natives in the destination country. If immigrants are on
average more skilled than natives, they will hurt skilled natives and bene¯t unskilled ones,
as their arrival will induce a decrease in the skilled wage and an increase in the unskilled
wage. Therefore, using data on attitudes towards the highly skilled, the empirical prediction
of the factor proportions analysis model is that, in every country, a negative relationship
should hold between voters' individual skill and attitudes towards skilled migration.
The main OECD destination countries of immigrant °ows are characterized by large
welfare states (Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick 2002), through which the public sector re-
distributes a substantial fraction of national income across individuals. In these contexts,
immigration has a non-negligible impact on public ¯nances, since foreign workers both con-
tribute to and bene¯t from the welfare state. The aggregate net e®ect of immigration on the
welfare state is either positive or negative, depending on the socio-economic characteristics
of immigrants relative to natives. Besides the aggregate e®ect, the arrival of immigrants
also implies income-distribution e®ects through the welfare-state channel. These e®ects are
crucial to understand public opinion on immigration.
Following Facchini and Mayda (2009), we can consider a simple redistributive system,
in which all income sources are taxed at the same rate and all individuals in the economy,
i.e. both natives and immigrants, are entitled to an equal lump sum per capita bene¯t. By
construction, this simple welfare system redistributes resources from high-income to low-
income individuals. To assess the e®ect of immigration through the welfare state, we can
consider two adjustment mechanisms. On the one hand, migration can bring about changes
in the tax rate, while per capita bene¯ts are kept constant (tax adjustment model). On the
other, the per capita bene¯ts can adjust while tax rates are unchanged (bene¯t adjustment
model).
If immigration is skilled, under both policy scenarios, all natives are likely to bene¯t
from the presence of foreign workers, due to a positive welfare spillover. However, the extent
to which natives bene¯t from skilled migration through the welfare state channel di®ers
according to each voter's income level. That is, there will be income distribution e®ects. In
5turn, these income distribution e®ects depend on the adjustment mechanism of the welfare
state to migration.
[INSERT Figure 1 APPROX HERE]
Figure 1 illustrates the working of the two adjustment models.7 In the two panels,
we plot the correlation between an individual's pre-tax income and pro-skilled-migration
attitudes. Under the tax adjustment model (left panel), all individuals bene¯t from the
in°ow of skilled foreign workers (the line is in the positive hortant), since the government
will be able to lower the tax rate (while keeping the level of per capita bene¯ts unchanged).
However, the reduction in the tax rate will bene¯t rich individuals to a greater extent than
poor ones, since tax payments represent a larger fraction of rich voters' net income.
Under the bene¯t adjustment model (right panel), an in°ow of skilled immigrants con-
tinues to bene¯t all individuals but will have a more pronounced e®ect on those individuals
that are at the receiving end of the welfare system, i.e. those with a low-income. The reason
is that the per capita bene¯t represents a larger fraction of a poor individual's net income,
thus changes in per capita bene¯ts a®ect this group more strongly. In particular, if a country
receives skilled migrants, the per capita bene¯t will increase, and all natives will be made
better o®, but poor ones more so than rich ones.
What are the implications of the welfare-state framework for the empirical analysis?
Using data on public opinion towards skilled immigrants, the prediction of the model is that
in every country attitudes and individual income should be positively correlated under the
tax adjustment model and negatively correlated under the bene¯t adjustment model.
A third channel through which migration a®ects the well being of natives (not necessarily
unevenly) is the price channel. For example, Cortes (2008) and Frattini (2008) focus on the
e®ect of unskilled immigration on the overall price level in the US and the UK, respectively.
Although there is no systematic study of the price e®ects of skilled immigration, they are
likely to exist and be substantial. In general, we expect the reduction in prices due to
skilled immigration to bene¯t everybody, thus giving rise to more favorable average attitudes
towards skilled migration. However, without further research, no clear predictions can be
made from the point of view of income distribution e®ects. Finally, besides the labor market,
the welfare state and the price channels, there is a fourth economic determinant of individual
attitudes, i.e. e±ciency considerations. In particular, skilled migration is likely to have
a strong impact on productivity and innovation activity. In relation to the latter e®ect,
Kerr and Lincoln (2008) evaluate the impact of high-skilled immigrants on US technological
7For a formal analysis, see Facchini and Mayda (2009).
6progress. They ¯nd a positive e®ect of higher numbers of H1B visas on innovation, primarily
through the direct contributions of ethnic inventors. The e®ect of skilled migration on
innovation activity is likely to be taken in great consideration by public opinion { especially
in countries at the frontier of technological research, such as the U.S. { as evidenced by the
media coverage of this topic (see, for instance, Economist, March 7, 2009). Once again,
while e±ciency considerations are likely to make public opinion more favorable to skilled
migration on average, it is unclear what their income distribution e®ects are.
To conclude, there are a number of economic channels through which public opinion
on skilled migration is a®ected. All of them, except the labor-market channel, imply a
favorable attitude towards skilled migrants, to a greater or smaller extent for di®erent types
of individuals.
From a non-economic point of view, public opinion on skilled migration is shaped by
political, cultural and security issues. Political considerations imply that skilled natives
should favor skilled migrants { since their arrival will increase the likelihood that the median
voter is skilled { while unskilled natives should oppose them (see Ortega 2005). Thus, from a
political point of view, we would expect a positive relationship between the level of individual
skill and favorable attitudes towards skilled migrants. From a cultural point of view, both
skilled and unskilled natives should welcome the skill quali¯cations of educated migrants, who
are likely to adjust to the local culture more quickly and with smaller assimilation costs than
unskilled migrants. Finally, from a security point of view, we expect public opinion to be in
favor of skilled migration since highly educated migrants are less likely to be undocumented
and therefore less likely to be involved in illegal activities.8 Thus, our overall expectation is
that attitudes towards skilled migration should be overwhelmingly favorable.
3 Summary statistics
We use the 2002-2003 round of the European Social Survey (ESS). The immigration question
we examine in the ESS data set is more speci¯c than the one analyzed in the existing
literature, as it asks directly about skilled migration. In particular, we use respondents'
answers to the following question: \Please tell me how important you think each of these
things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country]
should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it
8Both the cultural and security channels imply more favorable average attitudes towards skilled migrants.
However, no clear predictions can be made on income distribution e®ects.
7be for them to have good educational quali¯cations?..." We use the answers to this question
to construct the variable pro-skilled-migration, which ranges between 0 and 10 and is higher
the more the individual favors skilled migration. Summary statistics of pro-skilled-migration
and the other ESS variables included in the regressions are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
The summary statistics also provide information on the per capita GDP of the destination
country (in 2002, PPP-adjusted) { which comes from the World Development Indicators
data set { and on the relative skill ratio of natives to immigrants, which is measured as the
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations.9
The summary statistics show that public opinion on average supports skilled migration.
In the overall sample, the average of pro-skilled-migration is 6.23. There exists variation
across countries but is not substantial. All countries have average values of pro-skilled-
migration which range between 4.6 (corresponding to Sweden) and 7.7 (corresponding to
Greece) and median values which range between 5 (corresponding to Sweden and Norway)
and 8 (corresponding to Greece and Israel).
4 Empirical evidence
Using pro-skilled-migration as the dependent variable, we estimate ordered probit models
which control for country ¯xed e®ects { to account for unobserved, additive, country-speci¯c
e®ects { and have standard errors clustered by country { to account for heteroscedasticity
and correlation of individual observations within a country.
Table 3 presents the results of our estimation. In column (1), we investigate the impact
on attitudes of the socio-demographic background of the respondent. We ¯nd that older
respondents (i.e., respondents with a less recent year of birth) and males are more likely to
favor good educational quali¯cations of immigrants. On the other hand, being a citizen does
not a®ect views on skilled migration.
In regressions (2)-(4), we ¯nd evidence which is remarkably consistent with the predictions
of the theoretical model and with our ¯ndings in previous work (Mayda 2006, Facchini and
Mayda 2009). As pointed out by theory, the two key individual-level variables for the income-
distribution e®ects are the level of education { which captures the impact of labor-market
e®ects on attitudes { and the level of income { which captures the e®ect of welfare-state
9For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the
number of individuals with upper secondary or tertiary education to the number of individuals with lower
secondary education. We use 2002-2003 data on native and immigrant populations by level of education
(lower secondary education, upper secondary, tertiary) from Table I.12 SOPEMI (2005).
8considerations on attitudes. Our results in regression (2) show that, the higher the education
level attained by the respondent, the lower is the probability that he favors good educational
quali¯cations of immigrants (the coe±cient is signi¯cant at the 1% level). In particular, based
on speci¯cation (2), a one unit increase in the education level (for example, going from \lower
secondary or second stage of basic" to \upper secondary") decreases the likelihood that an
individual favors skilled migration by 2 percentage points.10 This result suggests that skilled
natives feel threatened by the labour-market competition of skilled migrants.11 In addition,
to the extent that political considerations are important (Ortega 2005), our estimates for
the impact of individual skill represent a lower-bound of the e®ect through the labor-market
channel (since the political channel works in the opposite direction).
Education and income are clearly correlated, as well-educated individuals tend to have
higher incomes. This implies that it is problematic to analyze the labor-market channel
independently from the welfare-state channel since the exclusion of individual income is
likely to produce an omitted variable bias in the estimation of the impact of education.12 On
the other hand, while education and income are positively and signi¯cantly correlated, they
are far from being perfectly collinear, which makes it possible to analyze them together.13
Thus, in regression (3), we introduce education and log of real income together in the same
speci¯cation. We ¯nd that, controlling for individual income, the impact of skill is still
negative and signi¯cant (at the 1% level). It is also larger in absolute value relative to the
estimate in regression (2)14, which is consistent with the expected omitted variable bias.
In addition, we ¯nd that the higher the level of real income of the respondent the higher
is the probability that he supports skilled migration. In particular, based on speci¯cation
(3), a one unit increase in the real income level increases the likelihood that an individual
10To facilitate the presentation of the marginal e®ects, we estimate a probit model. In particular, this
marginal e®ect is based on the estimation of a probit model which uses as the dependent variable a dichoto-
mous de¯nition of pro-skilled-migration attitudes { the dichotomous variable equals 1 if pro-skilled-migration
is greater or equal to 6, and equals 0 if pro-skilled-migration is smaller or equal to 5 { and the same regressors
as in column (2), Table 3.
11We have investigated whether the negative impact of education is more pronounced for individuals in
the labor force as opposed to individuals outside of the labor force. We ¯nd that indeed this is the case,
and this result is consistent with the e®ect working through the labor-market channel. However, since 75%
of the observations of the labor-force question are missing in the ESS sample, we refrain from reading too
much support into this result.
12Given that, as we will see, income has a positive impact on pro-skilled migration and income and
education are positively correlated, we expect a positive omitted variable bias, i.e. the estimate of education
without controlling for income should be biased towards zero.
13The correlation between education and income is in the ESS dataset 0:22.
14Based on speci¯cation (3) and using the dichotomous de¯nition of the pro-skilled-migration variable, the
marginal e®ect of education is ¡2:4 percentage points.
9favors skilled migration by 0:6 percentage points.15 This result is consistent with the tax
adjustment mechanism of the welfare state model. In particular, skilled migration is likely
to represent a net contribution for the destination country's welfare state. The reduction
in tax rates implied by the arrival of highly-quali¯ed foreign workers bene¯ts both poor
and rich respondents, but the rich to a greater extent than the poor. The estimates in this
paper in favor of the tax adjustment model are consistent with our previous ¯ndings based
on attitudes towards overall migration from the ISSP dataset (Facchini and Mayda 2009).
The results on the labor-market and welfare-state channels are robust to introducing
additional control variables in column (4). In that regression, we ¯nd that individuals
a±liated with the political right are more likely to favor good educational quali¯cations
for immigrants. On the other hand, surprisingly, trade union members are less likely to
support skilled migration. In addition, consistent with the discussion on the non-economic
determinants, individuals who are concerned about security and those who value traditions
and customs, respectively, are in favor of skilled migration.
To conclude, the results in regressions (2)-(4) show that skilled migration produces pro-
nounced income-distribution e®ects. Since the estimates are consistent with the tax adjust-
ment model, the income distribution e®ects implied by the welfare-state channel work in the
opposite direction relative to the labor market. In particular, individual skill and income
have opposite e®ects on individual attitudes towards skilled immigrants. Since education
and income tend to be positively associated, the labor market and welfare state channels
partially o®set each other. For example, the very same skilled and high-income professional
in Ireland may feel ambivalent regarding the arrival of skilled immigrants since he might
bene¯t from them from a welfare-state point of view { through reductions in his tax burden
{ but be hurt by them through labor-market substitution e®ects.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have carried out a cross{country analysis of individual preferences towards
skilled immigrants. We have shown that respondents across countries are broadly in favor
of skilled immigration. However, individual preferences also show substantial heterogeneity.
Our results show that non{economic factors, like the concern for national security or the
attachment to traditions and customs, play a signi¯cant role. Even more importantly, we
15This marginal e®ect is based on the estimation of a probit model which uses as the dependent variable
the dichotomous de¯nition of pro-skilled-migration attitudes and the same regressors as in column (3), Table
3.
10have found that economic drivers, working both through the labor market and the welfare
state, shape attitudes towards the highly skilled: Unskilled natives are more in favor of skilled
immigrants than their skilled counterparts; similarly, richer individuals are more favorable
than poorer ones.
Turning to migration policies, the broad support for skilled immigration we have unveiled
in our data suggests that a simple model of direct democracy is not fully able to explain the
limited di®usion of skill{selective immigration policies (Bertoli et al. 2009). One possible
explanation lies in the role played by interest groups which pressure policymakers to give a
higher weight to the opinion/utility of certain groups in society relative to the rest of public
opinion. For instance it is well known that, in the United States, professional associations
have been actively engaged in e®orts to limit skilled immigration. For example { in ana-
lyzing the role played by the American Medical Association { Bhagwati (2009) points out
that \...professional societies,..., can e®ectively condition and restrict in°ows, virtually act-
ing as gatekeepers... When skilled immigrants are involved, professional societies have the
possibility of not merely lobbying for restrictions but also are able, in cases, to apply \prior
restraint" by manipulating professional quali¯cation procedures." Systematically investigat-
ing the role of pressure groups { in shaping policies towards skilled immigration { in relation
to the rest of public opinion is an important avenue of future research.
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12Figure 1. The welfare state channelVariable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
pro-skilled-migration 30975 6.2273 2.7452 0 10
year of birth 30975 1955 17.5685 1893 1988
male 30975 0.4831 0.4997 0 1
citizen 30975 1.0382 0.1917 1 2
education (highest level attained) 30975 2.9868 1.4918 0 6














Austria 6.641365 7 3.348189 3.013095 29014.66 3.141503
Belgium 6.097203 7 3.055944 2.780771 27459.14 1.804188
Czech Republic 6.381974 7 3.111588 1.816185 16556.42 2.641453
Denmark 6.243116 7 3.287962 3.563468 28956.7 1.163756
Finland 6.335023 7 2.971847 3.211368 26018.38 1.244552
France 6.21119 7 3.039401 2.345164 26612.92 3.508463
Germany 6.721546 7 3.373154 3.216287 25545.68 5.656399
Greece 7.738864 8 2.199889 2.107014 18834.2 0.8265503
Hungary 6.823139 7 2.289609 1.068756 14159.44 0.6697858
Ireland 6.11385 7 2.806338 1.907975 35652.91 0.4042847
Israel 6.908894 8 3.502169 1.975383 22002.85 .
Italy 5.841424 6 2.317152 2.274649 25554.43 .
Luxembourg 6.485214 7 2.742607 3.338771 59976.5 2.054675
Netherlands 5.592118 6 3.042857 3.402215 29550.49 1.65946
Norway 5.150543 5 3.51164 3.769239 34750.03 1.422166
Portugal 5.975758 6 1.686869 2.042577 18398.29 0.3274704
Slovenia 6.306743 7 3.378289 1.525227 18017.7 .
Spain 6.135576 7 2.097859 2.140123 22444.72 0.5475358
Sweden 4.618788 5 3.090661 3.293816 26468.27 1.415028
Switzerland 6.218572 7 3.334807 4.539899 31019.92 5.193212
United Kingdom 6.287578 7 3.055587 3.754944 27175.5 2.038001
Table 1. Summary statistics of individual-level variables (ESS)
Summary statistics in these tables are based on the same observations as in regression 3, Table 4. These summary
statistics do not use design and population size weights. pro-skilled-migration ranges between 0 and 10 and it is higher
the more the individual thinks that it is important for immigrants to have good educational qualifications. education 
(highest level attained) goes from 0 to 6 (not completed primary education; primary or first stage of basic; lower
secondary or second stage of basic; upper secondary; post secondary, non-tertiary; first stage of tertiary; second stage of
tertiary). real income is household's total net income (expressed on a scale from 1 to 12) divided by the number of
household members. per capita gdp  in 2002 (PPP, constant 2000 international $) is from the World Bank.
The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant
populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the
number of individuals with upper secondary or tertiary education to the number of individuals with lower secondary
education. The RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 2002-2003 (OECD 2005).
Table 2.  Summary statistics of individual-level variables by country and of country-level variables 
R R R R R R R ROrdered probit with country dummies 1234
Dependent variable
year of birth -0.0067 -0.0057 -0.0054 -0.0047
0.0011** 0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0011**
male 0.0396 0.0499 0.0294 0.0681
0.0119** 0.0116** 0.0137* 0.0143**
citizen 0.0376 0.0364 0.021 -0.0062
0.0589 0.0657 0.0663 0.052
education (highest level attained) -0.0603 -0.0714 -0.0613
0.0133** 0.0143** 0.0174**
real income 0.0084 0.0145
0.0037* 0.0069*
trade union member -0.0321
0.0166+
rural (area of residence) 0.0096
0.0162




concerned about security 0.0991
0.0091**
importance of traditions and customs 0.0353
0.0056**
Observations 39035 38785 30975 25378
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
pro-skilled-migration
Table 3. Determinants of individual attitudes towards skilled migration (ESS)
The table reports coefficient estimates for ordered probit regressions (the cutoff values are not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are
presented under each coefficient. As recommended in the ESS website, our estimation uses both design and population size weights. + significant at 10%;
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects. pro-skilled-migration ranges between 0 and 10 and
it is higher the more the individual thinks that it is important for immigrants to have good educational qualifications. education (highest level attained)
goes from 0 to 6 (not completed primary education; primary or first stage of basic; lower secondary or second stage of basic; upper secondary; post
secondary, non-tertiary; first stage of tertiary; second stage of tertiary). real income is household's total net income (expressed on a scale from 1 to 12)
divided by the number of household members.
R R
R R